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ABSTRACT
Verification conditions (VCs) are logical formulae whose va-
lidity implies the correctness of a program with respect to a
specification. The technique of checking software properties
by specifying them in a program logic, then generating VCs,
and finally feeding these VCs to a theorem prover, is several
decades old. It is the underlying technology for state-of-the-
art program verifiers such as the Spec] programming sys-
tem, or ESC/Java. The classic way of computing VCs is by
means of Dijkstra’s weakest precondition calculus. However,
modern verification condition generators (VCgens), includ-
ing Spec] and ESC/Java’s VCgens, are based on an opti-
mized version of this algorithm, that avoids an exponential
growth of the VCs in the length of the program to be ver-
ified. For this optimized VCgen algorithm, only informal
soundness arguments are available. The main contribution
of this paper is a fully formal, machine-checked proof of the
soundness of such an efficient VCgen algorithm.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.4 [Software Engineering]: Software/Program Veri-
fication—Assertion checkers, Correctness proofs, Program-
ming by contract, Formal methods, Validation ; F.3.1 [Logics
and Meanings of Programs]: Specifying and Verifying
and Reasoning about Programs—Assertions; F.4.1 [Logics
and Meanings of Programs]: Mathematical Logic—Me-
chanical theorem proving
General Terms
Algorithms, Security, Languages, Verification
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The generation of a verification condition (VC) for a given
program is a common technique used by verification tools to
check the correctness of the program. This VC is then fed
into an interactive proof assistant (e.g. Coq or Isabelle) or,
preferably, an automated SMT solver (e.g. Z3 or Simplify)
to determine its validity, which would imply the correctness
of the program. ESC/Modula-3 [16], ESC/Java [5, 9, 13],
Boogie [1, 19, 2, 17, 15, 20] and Why [8, 18, 7] are examples
of tools using this technique.
A VC has many different but mathematically equivalent
formulations, and the choice of which formulation one uses
can influence the performance of the verification process dra-
matically. For example, the translation using weakest pre-
conditions as described in [6] produces VCs which grow ex-
ponentially in the size of the program. In order to make
verification practically possible it is important to avoid this
exponential blowup.
Whereas the classic computation of VCs has been studied
thoroughly, and even a machine-checked proof of soundness
of this VC generation algorithm is available [24], this is not
the case for the more efficient algorithms.
The contribution of this paper is a machine-checked proof
using Coq [3] for the VC generation algorithm (without sup-
port for raise/catch) described by Leino [14], which is es-
sentially a reformulation of the algorithm by Flanagan and
Saxe [10]. Leino defines a“dream property”which allows one
to rewrite the verification condition in such a way that its
size grows polynomially (instead of exponentially) in pro-
gram size. The dream property is only true for so-called
passive commands, i.e. commands which have no net ef-
fect on the program state. It is however possible to define
a program transformation – passification – which removes
all non-passive commands such as assignments and replaces
them by something equivalent [10].
The generation of VCs is done in multiple steps. We start
with an overview (Section 2) after which we zoom in on each
one separately and discuss them more thoroughly in Sections
3, 4, 5 and 6. All theorems have been proved in Coq: the
script can be found online at [4]. Throughout the text we
refer to Coq definitions using this font.
Due to space restrictions, we do not provide proofs but
instead refer the interested reader to [23, 4].
2. OVERVIEW
The approach we discuss to generate verification condi-
tions comprises a number of phases as shown in Figure 1.
The source code to be verified is first translated into an in-
source −→ IL
(command)
transform sa−−−−−−→ SA
(vcommand)
passify−−−→ passified
(pcommand)
wp−→ WP
(Prop)
Figure 1: Overview
termediate language (IL), which we formally define in Sec-
tion 3. An IL is used for the same reasons compilers do: the
same back-end can be reused for many different languages.
In our case this means the same technology can be used for
verifying C, Java, C], . . . [19, 2, 17, 15, 20]. The translation
from source code to IL falls outside the scope of this paper.
Such translations (including machine checked proofs) have
been done before for Java bytecode [12] and for a small OO
source language [24].
In our Coq proof, IL programs are represented by the com-
mand inductive data type, and their semantics are defined
by the step relation. This part is in fact the Achilles heel of
the script: an error could invalidate all proofs. Fortunately,
this “axiomatic part” amounts to only about 150 lines, most
of which is trivial. The main complexity lies in the defini-
tion of the operational semantics, which is why we included
a number of theorems showing that the described behaviour
does conform to our expectations.
Secondly, the IL program is transformed into single assign-
ment form (SA), which is the subject of Section 4. The main
theorem of that section is sa transformation fail, which states
the original IL-program and its SA-form behave “similarly”.
Approximately 1500 lines of the Coq script are dedicated to
this phase. SA-programs are represented by a different type
in the Coq script, namely vcommand, for reasons made clear
later. The reduction rules carry the name vstep and behave
in the exact same way as step.
Next comes passification, another program transformation
which is detailed in Section 5. Analogously with the previous
transformation, the main goal of that section is to show
that the SA-program and its passified form behave similarly
(vmultistep pmultistep fail). Definitions and proofs related to
this phase take up about 1200 lines of the script. Passified
programs have their own specialized type pcommand, and
predictably, a pstep relation describes their behaviour.
The last step is to generate the efficient weakest precon-
dition from the passified program. In Section 6, we prove
their soundness (soundness efficient wp) and show their size
is polynomial with respect to the size of the original IL-code
(polynomial wps). This part amounts to around 1000 lines.
3. INTERMEDIATE LANGUAGE
The IL is no ordinary programming language: instead of
representing a computation, it is meant to encode execution
paths populated with assertions, i.e. conditions that are ex-
pected to evaluate to true, regardless of the path through
which it was reached. The language provides a small number
of commands (command), listed in Figure 2. We define the
operational semantics as a binary relation between states,
called the single step relation (step) and written σ1 −→ σ2.
We distinguish two kinds of state (state): in-progress states
consisting of a command and a store (denoted 〈c, µ〉), and
failure states consisting of just a store (failure µ). A store is
a total mapping from identifiers to values. The single step
relation is defined as the smallest set of state pairs obeying
the rules appearing in Figure 3.
We summarily explain the commands’ behaviour:
• assert e demands that e evaluates to true in the cur-
rent store, or failure ensues. This command can be
used to prevent division by zero errors or null derefer-
ences, or to enforce programmer-specified correctness
conditions.
• assume e can be used to prune unimportant paths
from the execution tree. For example, the Java pro-
gramming language guarantees the this pointer can
never be null; the assume command can then be used
to inform the verifier it should not consider execution
paths where this is bound to null.
• skip is a no-operation, defined to simplify the opera-
tional semantics.
• x := e binds x to the value e evaluates to in the current
store. This command allows us to easily model execu-
tion paths of stateful programs, but becomes a burden
when it comes to producing weakest preconditions.
• c1; c2 provides command sequencing.
• c1 [] c2 is the sole source of nondeterminism: execution
can proceed with either c1 or c2. This command makes
it possible to model conditionals and loops.
We also define a multiple step relation (multistep) in the
obvious way.
Note that the operational semantics for this IL is non-
deterministic (see the reduction rules for c1 [] c2): the exe-
cution of a program can be seen as a tree whose root is the
initial state, whose leaves represent stuck states1 and where
nodes with multiple branches correspond to a nondetermin-
istic choice between possible execution paths. One of our
goals is to prevent the occurrence of failure states in this
tree. Weakest preconditions express the minimal require-
ments on the initial store for this to be the case.
We would like to highlight a peculiarity of the language:
since the store is a total mapping, there is no such thing
as an “empty initial store”. This means variables need no
declaration prior to use, but also leads to the question, what
value do unassigned variables have? The answer is simple:
a variable is bound to whatever value the store associates it
with (i.e. there are no default values nor is there a special
“uninitialized” value). Then what store should be used at
the beginning of execution? For the purpose of verification,
all possible stores must be considered. So, not only do we
have to deal with entire execution trees instead of linear
execution paths, but also with an infinitude of such trees.
None of these trees are allowed to have a failure state in
them.
1We define a stuck state as one for which no reduction rule
applies. For example, failure states are stuck states (but not
vice versa!) Section 6 discusses stuck states elaborately.
c ::= skip | assert e | assume e
| x := e | c1; c2 | c1[]c2
Inductive command : Set :=
| cSkip : command
| cAssert : expr -> command
| cAssume : expr -> command
| cAssign : id -> expr -> command
| cSequence : command -> command -> command
| cChoice : command -> command -> command.
Figure 2: Intermediate language grammar
e(µ) = true
〈assert e, µ〉 −→ 〈skip, µ〉
e(µ) 6= true
〈assert e, µ〉 −→ failure µ
e(µ) = true
〈assume e, µ〉 −→ 〈skip, µ〉
〈c1, µ〉 −→ 〈c′1, µ′〉
〈c1; c2, µ〉 −→ 〈c′1; c2, µ′〉
〈c1, µ〉 −→ failure µ′
〈c1; c2, µ〉 −→ failure µ′ 〈skip; c2, µ〉 −→ 〈c2, µ〉
〈x := e, µ〉 −→ 〈skip, µ[x 7→ e(µ)]〉
〈c1 [] c2, µ〉 −→ 〈c1, µ〉 〈c1 [] c2, µ〉 −→ 〈c2, µ〉
Figure 3: Single step reduction rules
4. SINGLE ASSIGNMENT FORM
This section describes an algorithm to transform an ar-
bitrary command to single assignment form (SA), a form
where each variable is assigned to at most once during execu-
tion and is not read from prior to this assignment. As noted
in the previous section, all variables have values pre-assigned
to them. For example, the program assert x = 3;x := 8 as-
signs a value to x twice: the implicit initial binding, and the
assignment of 8 to x. Thus, the example program is not SA.
A SA-transformation would be assert x = 3; y := 8.
The algorithm presented in this paper extends identifiers
with version numbers to deal with this issue in a simple
way. One can imagine all identifiers in the original program
have an implicit version number of 0 associated with them,
e.g. assert x0 = 3;x0 := 8. Transforming this into SA then
becomes a matter of simply incrementing the version number
in each assignment: assert x0 = 3;x1 := 8. Similarly, all
expressions need to be updated so they refer to the correct
version of variables. Thus, using version numbers is an easy
way to achieve “variable freshness.”
To keep track of variable versions, we use a version map
(vmap), which is a total map from identifiers to natural num-
bers. The transformation algorithm (transform sa, Figure 4)
then takes a command and version map, and returns a trans-
formed command and a new version map, e.g.
transform sa(assert x = 3;x := 8, λ id . 0) =
(assert x0 = 3;x1 := 8, (λ id . 0)[x 7→ 1])
A separate id type (vid), command type (vcommand) and
operational semantics (vstep, vmultistep) had to be defined
in the Coq script to deal with the version extensions. These
are virtually identical to their nonversioned twins, with the
exception that all identifiers carry numbers with them.
The SA transformation is rather straightforward except
for choice commands. It would be tempting to turn the
program graph into a tree (e.g. changing (ca [] cb); c2 into
(ca; c2) [] (cb; c2)), which leads to a series of deterministic
programs which can be dealt with separately in a simple
manner. However, the number of such programs grows expo-
nentially with the number of choice commands, which con-
flicts with the original goal of avoiding exponential blowup
during VC generation.
A better, more efficient way to deal with choice commands
consists of first transforming both branches to SA separately.
Since both branches could perform assignments to different
variables, their versions could get “out of sync”: the algo-
rithm returns different version maps for either branch. Con-
sider the following example:
x := 0; y := 0; (x := 5 [] y := 5); assert x 6= y
A first attempt to transform this to SA could be
x1 := 0; y1 := 0; (x2 := 5 [] y2 := 5); assert x2 6= y2
This is clearly not correct: if the left path is taken, x2 should
be compared to y1, and conversely, if the right path is taken,
x1 should be compared to y2.
To solve this problem, we build a “target version map”
νt which both branches have to accommodate to: at the
end of both their executions, all variables should have the
versions mentioned in νt. In the case of our example, with
νt = (λ id . 0)[x 7→ 2][y 7→ 2], we get
. . . ; (x2 := 5; y2 := y1 [] y2 := 5;x2 := x1);assert x2 6= y2
The y2 := y1 and x2 := x1 commands can be seen as syn-
chronization commands, which transform the current ver-
sion map to the target version map.
In order to transform ca [] cb with initial version map
ν0, the actual algorithm proceeds as follows: it first trans-
forms both branches ca and cb normally, resulting in trans-
formed commands c′a and c
′
b and updated version maps νa
and νb. It then builds (join) a target version map by tak-
ing the maximum version number for each variable: νt(x) =
max(νa(x), νb(x)). Next, it creates (sync vcommand) syn-
chronization commands d1 and d2 to handle the version
transition from νa and νb to νt. The final result of the trans-
formation of the choice command is then (c′1; d1 [] c
′
2; d2, νt).
Since there are an infinite number of identifiers, sync vcom-
mand can’t just scan every identifier in search of differing
version numbers to generate appropriate assignments for
them; instead, it needs to have an idea (more precisely, a
finite idea) of which identifiers could have different version
numbers. This problem is solved by collecting all assign-
ment targets (targets) of both branches into a finite set and
passing it along to sync vcommand.
Definition 1. We say stores are synchronized with respect
to a version map ν (store sync vstore) when
µ ∼ν µv ≡ ∀ x • µ(x) = µv(xν(x))
Theorem 1 (sa transformation fail) states that if the original
program fails (i.e. there exists an execution path leading to
a failure state), so will its SA transformation.
Fixpoint transform_sa c v :=
match c with
| cAssert e => (vcAssert (version_expr e v), v)
| cAssume e => (vcAssume (version_expr e v), v)
| cAssign x e =>
(vcAssign (x, 1 + v x) (version_expr e v),
inc v x)
| cSequence c1 c2 =>
let (c1’, v’) := transform_sa c1 v in
let (c2’, v’’) := transform_sa c2 v’ in
(vcSequence c1’ c2’, v’’)
| cSkip => (vcSkip, v)
| cChoice c1 c2 =>
let (c1’, v1’) := transform_sa c1 v in
let (c2’, v2’) := transform_sa c2 v in
let t1 := targets c1 in
let t2 := targets c2 in
let vt := join v1’ v2’ in
let t := IdSet.union t1 t2 in
let d1 := sync_vcommand t v1’ vt in
let d2 := sync_vcommand t v2’ vt in
(vcChoice (vcSequence c1’ d1)
(vcSequence c2’ d2), vt)
end.
Figure 4: SA Algorithm
Lemma 1. (sa transformation skip) If
〈c, µ〉 −→∗ 〈skip, µ′〉 ∧ µ ∼ν µsa
then, with (c′, ν′) = transform sa(c, ν)
〈c′, µsa〉 −→∗ 〈skip, µ′sa〉 ∧ µ′ ∼ν
′
µ′sa
Theorem 1. With (c′, ν′) = transform sa(c, ν),
〈c, µ〉 −→∗ failure µ′ ⇒ µ ∼ν µsa ⇒ 〈c′, µsa〉 −→∗ failure µ′sa
5. PASSIFICATION
The SA transformation discussed in the previous section
still produces assignments (in fact, it even adds some). In
order to produce our efficient weakest preconditions, we need
to get rid of those. This is where passification comes in: this
second transformation rewrites all assignments as assump-
tions. The following example program clearly fails:
x := 1;x := x+ 1; assert x = 3
First it is transformed into SA:
x1 := 1;x2 := x1 + 1; assert x2 = 3
Passification turns this into
assume x1 = 1; assume x2 = x1 + 1;assert x2 = 3
Note the importance of the SA-transformation: without it
we would get
assume x = 1; assume x = x+ 1;assert x = 3
which would not fail, contrary to the first three programs.
As in Section 4, we define a new command type (pcom-
mand), which does not provide an assignment operation.
A new set of reduction rules is also required (pstep, pmul-
tistep), which lack assignment-describing logic. Since the
Fixpoint passify c : pcommand :=
match c with
| vcAssert e => pcAssert e
| vcAssume e => pcAssume e
| vcSkip => pcSkip
| vcSequence c1 c2 =>
pcSequence (passify c1) (passify c2)
| vcChoice c1 c2 =>
pcChoice (passify c1) (passify c2)
| vcAssign x e =>
assume_from_assign x e
end.
Figure 5: Passification algorithm
store is never updated, we can factor it out: instead of
〈c, µ〉 −→ 〈c′, µ〉, we write c µ−−→ c′, and similarly for the
multiple step relation.
The passification algorithm (passify), shown in Figure 5,
is rather straightforward. We demonstrate its soundness by
proving that if the execution of the SA-transformation of a
given command encounters failure, so will its passification
(Theorem 2, vmultistep pmultistep fail).
Definition 2. We define store equivalence up to a certain
version map as
µ
≤ν∼ µ′ ≡ ∀ x, n • n ≤ ν(x)⇒ µ(xn) = µ′(xn)
Lemma 2. (vmultistep pmultistep skip) Let
(c′, ν′) = transform sa(c, ν)
then
〈c′, µ〉 −→∗ 〈skip, µ′〉 ⇒ µ′ ≤ν
′
∼ µ′′ ⇒ c′ µ
′′
−−→∗ skip
Lemma 3. (single assignment monotonic store fail) Let
(c′, ν′) = transform sa(c, ν)
then
〈c′, µ〉 −→∗ failure µ′ ⇒ µ ≤ν∼ µ′
Theorem 2. Let (c′, ν′) = transform sa(c, ν), then
〈c′, µ〉 −→∗ failure µ′′ ⇒ passify(c′) µ
′′
−−→∗ failure
6. WEAKEST PRECONDITIONS
In this section we discuss the notion of weakest precondi-
tions: we formally define them, prove their soundness, and
show how their size varies in terms of program size.
When looking at the operational semantics reduction rules
(Figure 3), we can identify three classes of stuck states:
• there is no way out of a failure state.
• assume commands can block further execution in case
their associated expression does not evaluate to true in
the current store. These may also be nested within a
complicated sequencing structure (nested assume).
• if execution can proceed unhindered, it will eventually
end up with a skip command: this is as close as we
can get to successful program termination.
Fixpoint wp vmu c Q {struct c} : Prop :=
match c with
| pcAssert e => (e vmu = T) /\ Q
| pcAssume e => e vmu = T -> Q
| pcChoice c1 c2 => wp vmu c1 Q /\
wp vmu c2 Q
| pcSequence c1 c2 => wp vmu c1 (wp vmu c2 Q)
| pcSkip => Q
end.
Fixpoint wlp vmu c Q {struct c} : Prop :=
match c with
| pcAssert e => e vmu = T -> Q
| pcAssume e => e vmu = T -> Q
| pcChoice c1 c2 => wlp vmu c1 Q /\
wlp vmu c2 Q
| pcSequence c1 c2 => wlp vmu c1 (wlp vmu c2 Q)
| pcSkip => Q
end.
Figure 6: Weakest preconditions
We define two kinds of weakest preconditions:
• the weakest conservative precondition (wp) of a pro-
gram c with respect to a predicateQ, writtenwp(c,Q),
is the condition which the initial store has to satisfy so
that execution cannot reach failure, and that for every
execution path ending up in skip (i.e. the third class
of stuckness), the final store satisfies Q;
• the weakest liberal precondition (wlp) of a program
c with respect to a predicate Q, denoted wlp(c,Q),
allows failure to occur, and only guarantees that when
execution reaches skip, the final store will satisfy Q.
One way of defining these [6] is shown in Figure 6. Theo-
rem 3 states that given a passified program c, if the weakest
conservative preconditions are true for some store µ, execu-
tion starting with this store will not reach failure.
Theorem 3. For any passified program c,
∀ Q • µ ² wp(c,Q) ⇒ ¬ c µ−−→∗ failure
We do not rely on the property that Q holds after suc-
cessful execution, but wp(c,Q) = wp(c;assert Q, true) to-
gether with Theorem 3 and the operational semantics shows
that Q holds. A similar case can be made for wlp.
The problem with the definitions given in Figure 6 is the
size of the resulting VCs. The troublemaker is once more
the choice command, which again leads to an exponential
explosion, as the predicate Q is duplicated. However, it is
possible to rewrite this so that Q appears only once [14,
10]. First, we split up the guarantees made by the weakest
conservative preconditions into two cases: the program must
not fail, and each time execution reaches skip, Q must be
satisfied (wp rewrite):
Theorem 4. For any passified program c,
wp(c,Q)⇔ wp(c, true) ∧wlp(c,Q)
Next, we rewrite the weakest liberal preconditions as “ei-
ther execution does not reach skip, or Q was true all along”
(wlp rewrite).
Fixpoint efficient_wlp vmu c Q : Prop :=
match c with
| pcAssert e => e vmu = T -> Q
| pcAssume e => e vmu = T -> Q
| pcSkip => Q
| pcSequence c1 c2 =>
efficient_wlp vmu c1 (efficient_wlp vmu c2 Q)
| pcChoice c1 c2 =>
(efficient_wlp vmu c1 False /\
efficient_wlp vmu c2 False) \/ Q
end.
Fixpoint efficient_wp vmu c Q : Prop :=
match c with
| pcAssert e => e vmu = T /\ Q
| pcAssume e => e vmu = T -> Q
| pcSkip => Q
| pcSequence c1 c2 =>
efficient_wp vmu c1 (efficient_wp vmu c2 Q)
| pcChoice c1 c2 =>
efficient_wp vmu c1 True /\
efficient_wp vmu c2 True /\
efficient_wlp vmu (pcChoice c1 c2) Q
end.
Figure 7: Efficient weakest preconditions
Theorem 5. For any passified program c,
wlp(c,Q)⇔ wlp(c, false) ∨Q
Note that these reformulations are only valid in a stateless
context, hence the need for passification. This leads to the
alternate formulation of the weakest preconditions shown in
Figure 7. We are now ready to demonstrate the soundness
of the efficient weakest preconditions (Theorem 6, sound-
ness efficient wp).
Theorem 6. Let cp be the passified SA-form of c
² wpe(cp, true)⇒ ∀ µµ′ • ¬ 〈c, µ〉 −→∗ failure µ′
Finally, we must prove our claim that the weakest precon-
ditions are polynomial in size with respect to program size.
This bound is not tight: proving the tight bound correct in
Coq revealed to be quite difficult.
Theorem 7. Let c be a program, then
|wpe(c,Q)| = O(|c|4 + |Q|)
7. RELATED WORK
There is a huge amount of related work in program verifi-
cation in general and hence, we necessarily focus on research
results most closely related to ours. For a good overview of
the state-of-the-art in program verification in general, we
refer to [11].
A first related line of work is the research on verifiers that
rely on VC generation, in particular on the optimized VC
generation that is the subject of this paper. This includes
the ESC/Modula-3 verifier [16], the ESC/Java verifiers [9,
13], the VCC verifier [19] and the Spec] verifier [2].
The Why/Krakatoa/Caduceus line of tools [8] is a very in-
teresting competitor to the Boogie/Spec]/VCC line of tools:
both toolsets are similarly built around an intermediate ver-
ification language and provide front-ends for Java-like and
C-like languages. To avoid trust in the tool-chain, the Why
VC generator adopts an approach where the proof produced,
possibly with the help of other tools or the user, is checked
a posteriori by an automatic checker.
Another important related area of research is the devel-
opment of machine-checked proofs of programming language
properties in general. The POPLmark challenge [22] is a set
of benchmarks designed to evaluate the progress of mecha-
nization of metatheory of programming languages, but the
focus is more on type systems than on verification. In the
Mobius project [21], machine-checked proofs of many pro-
gramming language properties are being studied with the
purpose of supporting proof-carrying code to certify security-
related properties of programs. The project has worked out
a machine-checked proof of the soundness of their program
logic (the Mobius Base Logic) with respect to an operational
semantics of Java bytecode. As part of the Mobius project,
Lehner and Mu¨ller have shown the translation of Java byte-
code to BoogiePL sound [12]. A machine-checked proof of
the soundness of standard weakest-precondition based VC
generation for a variant of the Boogie intermediate language
is also available [24].
8. CONCLUSION
A chain is only as trustworthy as the weakest of its links.
Verification has relied on automated checking by the com-
puter, based on theoretical ideas which thus far were only
proved informally. For example, the proofs in [10] which in-
spired this paper consist of just one line. Our contribution
is to provide a Coq-certified single-assignment transforma-
tion and passification algorithm accompanied by a number
of machine-checked soundness proofs, further guaranteeing
correctness and thus giving us assurance that current and
future verifiers built upon this technology can indeed be
trusted. The full Coq proof script can be found online [4]
and is included in [23].
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